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I. INTRODUCTION
The present panel, captioned the "Evolving Dynamics of Intervention to
End Atrocities and Secure Accountability," analyzes developments in the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention and corresponding efforts to secure
accountability for mass atrocities in the context of recent events in Kosovo, East
Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia.
The doctrine of "humanitarian intervention," defined for the purposes of
this discussion as the threat or use of force or other coercive measures by states
or international or regional organizations in response to gross violations of
human rights, has assumed an increasingly prominent profile in recent years,
both in international discourse and through United Nations and state practice in
such regions as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, East Timor and Sierra Leone.
The contemporary agenda of the United Nations Secretary-General has reflected
this development. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly in
September 1999, for example, Secretary-General Annan proclaimed that the
core challenge to the United Nations, and specifically the Security Council, in
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the next century will be to "forge unity behind the principle that massive and
systematic violations of human rights-wherever they may take place-should
not be allowed to stand." The Secretary-General repeated this challenge in his
Millennium Report, "We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the
21st Century," in which he called upon United Nations member-states to unite
in the pursuit of more effective policies to stop mass murder and egregious
violations of human rights. In urging this approach, Secretary-General Annan
emphasized that while armed intervention must always remain the option of last
resort, in the face of gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend
every precept our common humanity it is an option that cannot be relinquished.
This rise in instances of humanitarian intervention in gross human rights
violations has also witnessed a recognition and practice on the part of the
international community that such intervention must be accompanied by
mechanisms to secure individual accountability for those human rights
violations. The creation through United Nations Security Council resolutions
of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for
Rwanda in the early 1990s constituted milestones in this respect. Variations on
these initiatives have been canvassed more recently in the post-intervention
environments in Sierra Leone and East Timor, with the United Nations playing
a leading role in the development of accountability mechanisms in those
regions. My colleagues on this panel will address the particulars of each of
these instances in more detail.
My presentation considers the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in the
context of current efforts to seek accountability for atrocities committed by the
Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia in the 1970s. In summary, the Cambodia
experience suggests that the absence of timely intervention by the international
community to prevent or punish Khmer Rouge atrocities significantly limited
the United Nations' present-day ability to influence the creation of a Khmer
Rouge tribunal or to ensure that any such tribunal is competent, impartial, and
effective. Correspondingly, these conclusions militate in favor of humanitarian
intervention in future atrocities where, at least prior to the establishment of the
International Criminal Court, ad hoc measures by the international community
may be necessary to secure accountability for those atrocities.
f1. THE HISTORY OF KHMER ROUGE ATROCITIES AND RECENT EFFORTS TO
SECURE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KHMER ROUGE CRIMES

In April 1975, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), more
commonly known as the Khmer Rouge, seized power from Cambodia's Khmer
Republic Government and established a brutal authoritarian regime, which it
subsequently named Democratic Kampuchea (DK), under the political and
ideological leadership of Pol Pot. What followed during its nearly four years
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of rule were increasingly widespread and violent campaigns of displacement,
forced labor, arrests, torture, and executions. These atrocities were perpetrated
under the guise of CPK policies that sought to construct a socially and
ethnically homogeneous society and rid the country, and increasingly the
Communist Party itself, of perceived enemies of the Communist revolution.
Millions of Cambodians were displaced and subjected to inhumane living and
working conditions during the period of DK rule, and it is estimated that over
one million Cambodians perished as a consequence of the Khmer Rouge's
deadly policies.
The Khmer Rouge's rule ended in January 1979, when, following a
protracted and escalating border war with Vietnam, Vietnamese forces launched
a full-scale invasion of Cambodia, took Phnom Penh, and installed the
opposition group in power, which later declared itself the People's Republic of
Kampuchea. With the collapse of Democratic Kampuchea, many remaining
Khmer Rouge members fled and re-established themselves on the CambodiaThai border. Over the next decade, CPK forces maintained an armed resistance
against the Vietnam-backed Cambodian government. In 1993, however, the
Khmer Rouge ceased to be an active fighting force, due principally to the
defection from the CPK of Khmer Rouge guerrillas in response to offers of
amnesty from prosecution by the Cambodian government.
Throughout this period, neither the perpetration of atrocities by the Khmer
Rouge nor the issue of accountability for those atrocities were the subject of
constructive action by the international community. It was not until 1997 that
the United Nations contemplated concrete measures to bring surviving Khmer
Rouge members to justice. In a jointly-authored letter to the United Nations
Secretary-General dated June 21, 1997, former first Prime Minister of
Cambodia Prince Norodom Ranariddh and second Prime Minister Hun Sen
requested the assistance of the United Nations and the international community
in "bringing to justice those persons responsible for the genocide and crimes
against humanity during the rule of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979." The
letter also indicated that Cambodia did not have the resources or expertise to
conduct this very important procedure, and specifically requested assistance
similar to that of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Following receipt of the June 1997 letter, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted a resolution in December 1997 requesting that the SecretaryGeneral consider the possible appointment of a group of experts to respond to
Cambodia's request for assistance. In July 1998, the Secretary-General
appointed a three-member group of experts with a three-fold mandate: 1) to
evaluate existing evidence to determine the nature of the crimes Khmer Rouge
leaders committed in the years 1975 to 1979; 2) to assess the feasibility of
apprehending, detaining and extraditing, or surrendering Khmer Rouge leaders;
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and 3) exploring options for bringing Khmer Rouge leaders to justice before an
international or national jurisdiction.
The group of experts subsequently delivered its report to the SecretaryGeneral on February 22, 1999, which concluded that serious crimes under
international and Cambodian law had been committed during the period of CPK
rule. These crimes included genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
other acts incurring individual responsibility, in particular torture, forced labor,
and crimes against internationally-protected persons. The group of experts also
recommended that the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly
establish an ad hoc international tribunal to prosecute those persons most
responsible for the most serious violations of human rights during the DK era.
In making this recommendation, the group specifically rejected the option of
establishing a tribunal under Cambodian law. This was based upon the group's
informed opinion that Cambodia continued to lack a culture of respect for an
impartial justice system, and the group's corresponding concern that domestic
prosecutors, investigators, and judges may be subject to political pressure and
influence.
In the interim, however, events transpired in Cambodia that further
complicated the United Nations' efforts to secure accountability for Khmer
Rouge crimes. In July 1997, Hun Sen and his Cambodian People's Party seized
exclusive control of the Cambodian government, and later rejected the group of
expert's call for an ad hoc international tribunal, claiming that any decision to
bring Khmer Rouge leaders to justice must take into account Cambodia's need
for peace and national reconciliation and that Cambodian courts were "fully
competent" to conduct trials of former CPK officials. At the same time, Pol Pot
was captured and subjected to a show trial by his CPK compatriots in 1997.
This, followed by Pol Pot's death in April 1998, galvanized world attention on
the question of accountability of surviving Khmer Rouge members for DK-era
crimes. This was accompanied in 1998 and 1999 by the surrender or capture of
several of the most prominent surviving members of the Khmer Rouge
leadership, including former CPK Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea, former CPK
Foreign Minister Ieng Sary, former DK state president Khieu Samphan, former
head of the Southwest Region Ta Mok, and former director of the prison and
torture facility at Tuol Sleng, Kaing Khek Iev, better known as Duch.
These developments have since resulted in prolonged negotiations between
the United Nations and Hun Sen's government to find a compromise on the
convocation of Khmer Rouge trials. In the course of these negotiations, the
Cambodian Government has steadfastly rejected the creation of a fullyindependent international tribunal, but has at most expressed some support for
the establishment of a domestic tribunal with limited international participation
and a narrowly-defined personal jurisdiction. For its part, the United Nations
appears to have abandoned any call for an international tribunal, and has
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endeavored to negotiate attributes of a tribunal established under Cambodian
law that would render Khmer Rouge prosecutions fair and impartial. Such
attributes have included in particular an effective and independent role for the
international community in any domestic prosecutions. Although the latest
round of negotiations between the United Nations and the Cambodian
government concluded in July of 2000, the particulars of any agreement
between the parties have not been officially publicized. Currently, it appears to
have been left to the Cambodian government to take the legislative measures
necessary to establish a Khmer Rouge tribunal.
III. THE ABSENCE OF TIMELY INTERVENTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
PROSECUTING KHMER ROUGE ATROCITIES

As alluded to above, during the course of the Khmer Rouge regime and for
much of the subsequent period of civil conflict in Cambodia, the international
community did not intervene to prevent or seek accountability for the
commission of DK-era atrocities. To the contrary, an anti-Vietnam coalition of
states composed of China, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations, and the
United States ensured through United Nations General Assembly's Credentials
Committee that the Khmer Rouge retained Cambodia's seat in the United
Nations General Assembly through most of the 1980s.
While the international community took concrete measures in the late
1980s to end the conflict between the warring factions in Cambodia, this
process ultimately did not address the issue of accountability for Khmer Rouge
crimes. An internationally-sponsored peace process, the Paris Conference on
Cambodia, was convened in 1989 and ultimately led to a comprehensive peace
settlement between the principal factions in Cambodia, although the Khmer
Rouge subsequently refused to comply with most of the terms of the settlement.
The agreement provided for the establishment of the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was given the mandate
of establishing a peaceful and neutral environment in Cambodia for the conduct
of elections and responsibilities for demobilizing and disarming the rival forces
in Cambodia. However, the settlement contained no explicit provision for
Khmer Rouge trials, and such a process was not included in UNTAC's mandate.
Rather, the matter was left to the future Cambodian government.
In light of the absence of humanitarian intervention in CPK atrocities, and
without addressing the feasibility of such intervention or the morality of the
international community's conduct in this regard, the present analysis endeavors
to draw insights respecting the effect of this non-intervention upon recent efforts
by the United Nations to secure accountability for Khmer Rouge atrocities. The
Cambodia experience suggests that the absence of timely intervention by the
international community to prevent or punish Khmer Rouge atrocities
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significantly limited the United Nations' present-day ability to influence the
creation of a Khmer Rouge tribunal or to ensure that any such tribunal is
competent, impartial, and effective.
More particularly, the international community's inaction in the face of
Khmer Rouge atrocities has been depicted by some as undermining the United
Nations' political and moral authority to call for the establishment of an
international tribunal to prosecute DK-era crimes. Prime Minister Hun Sen has
exploited this apparent weakness on numerous occasions, citing in particular the
CPK's retention of Cambodia's seat in the United Nations General Assembly
in challenging the legitimacy of current United Nations efforts to create an
international Khmer Rouge tribunal. The Cambodian government has likewise
disparaged the considerable delay in international action on Khmer Rouge
crimes, arguing early on that after over twenty years, such matters may be best
left buried in the past. And unlike the recent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, the United Nations is not able to draw political or legal support
from Security Council resolutions adopted contemporaneously with the
perpetration of Khmer Rouge atrocities as to the international criminality of the
conduct Khmer Rouge members and their susceptibility to prosecution before
an international tribunal.
These limitations on the United Nations' negotiating authority have been
exacerbated by the fact that, in the delay following the fall of Democratic
Kampuchea, individuals who may potentially be implicated in Khmer Rouge
atrocities have assumed influential positions with the current Cambodian
government. In particular, Prime Minister Hun Sen and various other current
Cambodian officials were previously members of the CPK and, according to
some observers, may constitute potential targets in open-ended and rigorous
Khmer Rouge prosecutions. Indeed, this possibility has been cited by some
authorities as explaining in part Prime Minister Hun Sen's opposition to the
establishment of a fully independent Khmer Rouge tribunal with broad personal
jurisdiction.
In the face of these political shortcomings, the United Nations has had little
choice but to abandon its recommended approach of establishing an
international Khmer Rouge tribunal. Rather, it has been relegated to negotiating
some degree of meaningful international participation in domesticallyconstituted Khmer Rouge trials, and this despite concerns expressed by its own
group of experts and civil society more generally that the Cambodian justice
system cannot support fair or impartial trials. Although this does not
necessarily foreclose the possibility that an appropriate accommodation might
be reached on Cambodian-constituted prosecutions, it has placed the United
Nations in an exceedingly problematical negotiating position and with
considerably less control over whether a Khmer Rouge tribunal will ultimately
be established.
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The absence of timely humanitarian intervention in preventing or
punishing Khmer Rouge atrocities may also be considered to have limited the
United Nations' ability to ensure that a Khmer Rouge tribunal, if established,
is competent, impartial, and effective. It is apparent, for example, that the
effective personal jurisdiction of a Khmer Rouge tribunal has been significantly
restricted, resulting in a diminishing number of potential defendants available
for prosecution. Among the key candidates for prosecution who have died since
the period of DK rule are CPK Secretary Pol Pot and General Staff Chairman
Son Sen. Moreover, in light of the fact that most, if not all, of the remaining
potential candidates live within Cambodia's borders, the United Nations must
rely entirely upon the Cambodian government to secure the arrest of suspects
who may be indicted by a Khmer Rouge tribunal. While likely candidates for
prosecution, such as Ieng Sary and Nuon Chea, reportedly live freely in
Cambodia, the Hun Sen government's commitment in this regard is open to
serious question. The early establishment of an appropriate international
presence within a jurisdiction like Cambodia, on the other hand, arguably
provides the international community with some independent avenue through
which to secure effective jurisdiction over suspected perpetrators of atrocities.
The international community has also found itself at a considerable
disadvantage in facilitating the search for pertinent evidence for potential
Khmer Rouge prosecutions. As with potential suspects, victims and witnesses
of Khmer Rouge atrocities have died or their memories have diminished since
the 1970s. Despite the impressive efforts of institutions, such as the
Documentation Centre of Cambodia, in gathering, cataloguing, and translating
DK-era documentation, it has been recognized by the United Nations group of
experts and other authorities that many potentially incriminating documents
have been lost or destroyed since 1979. Further, the delays in investigations
have aggravated difficulties in identifying and authenticating what documentary
and other physical evidence may still be available for use in Khmer Rouge
prosecutions. Conversely, a timely international presence may facilitate the
collection and verification of potentially relevant documents and other evidence.
International inaction on Khmer Rouge atrocities has also complicated the
process of identifying the proper subject matter jurisdiction of a current CPK
tribunal. In this connection, the general legal principle nullum crimen sine lege
limits the crimes for which an individual may be prosecuted to those that were
considered criminal under domestic or international law at the time they were
committed. As a consequence, present-day efforts to establish a Khmer Rouge
tribunal must endeavor to define the substance of Cambodian and international
law as it stood over twenty years ago.
Finally and more generally, the absence of any effective international
intervention initiative in Cambodia has diminished the United Nations'
operational independence to serve as a control against unfairness and
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impropriety in any domestic Khmer Rouge prosecutions that may be convened.
This may be especially significant in respect to such matters as witness
protection and tribunal staffing, which are particularly susceptible to improper
influence and abuse.
IV. CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis should not be taken to suggest that the international
community lacks any authority to influence the creation or conduct of a Khmer
Rouge tribunal by Cambodia, or that it is not still possible to convene proper
and effective trials of surviving members of the Khmer Rouge regime through
a carefully designed tribunal under Cambodian law with appropriate and
effective international participation.
The Cambodia experience should,
however, serve as a stark illustration of the risks and complications posed when
the international community fails to intervene in a timely manner in response
to gross violations of human rights. The future implications of such
intervention could mean the difference between accountability and impunity.

